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1.  Introduction 
 
The problem of justice and fair distribution of resources is central in economics as it affects a 
wide range of issues including, among others, rules for fiscal policies, criteria rewarding merit and 
wage distribution within firms.  
The  main  conceptions  of  justice  range  from  the  extremes  of  strict  egalitarianism
1 t o  
libertarianism
2 o r  t h e  e n t i t l e m e n t  t h e o r y
3 w h i l e ,  i n  t h e  m i d d l e ,  a  l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l 
contributions argue that individuals should be  deemed  responsible  for  what depends on  factors 
under individual control so that only wealth inequalities depending on such factors may be accepted 
(Cappelen et al. 2007). For example, Buchanan (1986) argues that, with regard to the four factors 
determining the distribution of claims on economic income and wealth (i.e. luck, choice, effort, and 
birth),  only  differences  attributable  to  effort  are f a i r .  D w o r k i n  ( 2 0 0 0 )  e m p h a s i z e s  e q u a l i t y  b u t  
admits limited inequality that could be the consequence of the effect of single choices
4. Roemer 
(1998) argues that meritocracy should be essentially based on and reward only effort.  
As it is well known, concepts of justice  and criteria for allocating economic resources vary 
significantly  according  to  the  position  of  the  decision  makers.  Randomized  experiments 
demonstrate  that  “stakeholders”  (i.e.  subjects  whose  decisions  on  the  criteria  for  allocating 
resources directly affect their own payoff) decide differently from “spectators” (i.e. subjects who 
choose a distributive criterion that affects payoff of other play ers) (Konow, 2011) and that the 
                                                 
1 Strict egalitarianism implies the absence of any kind of inequality in wealth distribution even when people contribute 
in different ways to wealth creation. 
2 Libertarianism establishes that individuals should be considered totally responsible for their contributions in producing 
wealth  (whatever  their  merit  in  achieving  them)  and a  f a i r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s h o u l d  p r e c i s e l y  r e f l e c t  t h e  d ifferent 
contributions. 
3The entitlement theory (Nozick, 1974) establishes that, if a person acquires a holding without infringing the principle 
of justice in acquisition, or in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, he is entitled to the holding. This 
approach does not leave room to interventions aimed at preventing and/or modifying acquisitions that are in accordance 
with the previous principles, even if the interventions are elaborated starting from some ideas of meritocracy or need. 
4 “Individuals should be relieved of consequential responsibility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are 
brute bad luck, but not from those that should be seen as flowing from their own choices” (Dworkin (2000), p. 73). 3 
 
presence/absence of of information about  relative abilities and payoff distribution under different 
criteria plays a crucial role (Becchetti et al., 2011; Durante and Putterman 2007). 
In  this  paper  we  wonder  whether  there  is  a  gender  difference  in  allocation  criteria  chosen  by 
decision makers in different positions with/without information about  their relative abilities and 
payoffs under different criteria. 
More specifically, we start from some widely acknowledged results in the literature telling us 
that women generally tend to be more risk averse, less overconfident, more inequity averse and 
more competitive averse than men (see the section below) and test whether they are relatively more 
oriented toward less unequal criteria or criteria involving some form of protection, as these results 
would lead us to presume. 
To do so we analyze data from an experiment with task performance, multiplicity of allocation 
criteria and variety of positions from which allocators take their decisions on the division of a sum 
of 210 euros among 15 individuals. More specifically, participants to the experiment are asked to 
perform  a  first  task  involving  mainly  effort  and  a  second  task  involving  mainly  talent.  The 
allocation criteria which can be chosen are: i) full egalitarianism (equal parts), ii) randomness, iii) 
“pure” talent, iv) talent plus protection (an equal division of 30 percent of the sum), v) “pure” effort, 
vi) effort plus protection and vii) randomness plus protection, with allocations based on talent and 
effort depending on participants’ performance on the two respective tasks (see section 3 for the 
description  of  tasks).  Decisions  are  taken  under  five  different  positions  including  those  of:  i) 
stakeholders who decide before knowing their relative payoff under different criteria and ii) may 
revise their decision after information is provided (that is, after performing the task and knowing 
relative  performances  and  consequent  payoffs);  iii) s t a k e h o l d e r s  w h o  d e c i d e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  
already  with  full  information;  spectators  iv)  without  and  v)  with  information  (before  and  after 
knowing the relative performance and payoffs of a group of participants for which they have to 
decide). 4 
 
We find that the null hypothesis of absence of a gender effect is rejected since women choose 
relatively  more  criteria  involving  some  form  of  protection.  We  then  wonder  what  are  the 
determinants of the relative preference for protection among those mentioned above. The puzzle 
here is that the gendered preference for protection exists not only  for stakeholders but also for 
spectators while it disappears for both when they have  information about relative payoff under 
different criteria. 
The significant result on spectators leads us to exclude risk aversion and overconfidence as the 
only drivers of our findings. Competition aversion cannot fully explain the main result as well. In 
case of a general ideological aversion to competition the preference for protection should survive 
also after knowing the payoff distribution under different criteria. If, on the other hand, aversion has 
to be intended against one’s own participation to competitive races, the gendered preference for 
protection should not be there for spectators.  
Since  the  only  difference  before  and  after  the  removal  of  the  veil  of  ignorance  for  both 
stakeholders and spectators is the information on payoff distributions, a form of general aversion to 
inequality (intended as not only toward one’s own payoffs) could explain part of what we observe 
under  the  assumption  that  women  (regardless  of  their  spectator/stakeholder  condition),  without 
information about payoff distribution, choose relatively more protection in order to reduce payoff 
inequality but, after observing the payoff distribution, decide that the problem is not too severe.  
The paper is divided into six sections including introduction and conclusions. In the second 
section we present a short survey of the literature on the gender effect on preferences. In the third 
section  we  outline  our  experiment  design.  In  the  fourth  section  we  formulate  our  research 
hypotheses. In the fifth section we present and comment our descriptive and econometric findings. 
The sixth section concludes. 
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2.  The literature on the gender effect on preferences  
 
There  is  a  growing  interest  among  economists  and  policymakers on gender differences in a 
number of different domains and on their policy implications (for a detailed review on gender 
differences in preferences and economic experiments see Croson and Gneezy, 2009).  
In particular, there is widespread agreement that women exhibit more risk aversion than men 
(Arch,1993; Holt and Laury, 2002
5; Borghans et al., 2009; Hartog et al., 2002; Schubert et al., 
1999; Powell and Ansic,1997; Dohmen et al., 2008). A candidate explanation for these findings is 
that  women  have  stronger  emotional  reactions  to  risky  situations,  which  can  also  affect  their 
probability perceptions (Loewenstein et al., 2001)
6. A second reason for gender differences in risk 
attitudes and in the evaluation of risk may relate to confidence. The literature finds that, under 
uncertain situations, men are more overconfident than women in their success (Lichtenstein et al. 
1982; Deaux and Farris, 1977; Lundeberg et al., 1994).  
Differently from risk aversion, results on gendered differences concerning social preferences (in 
particular altruism, inequality aversion, trust and reciprocity) are not unambiguous. A number of 
studies have demonstrated that women trust less or the same as men, while some others find women 
more trusting than men (Bellemare and Kröger, 2003; Bohnetn et al., 2007). Similarly, while some 
studies have found no gender differences in reciprocity (Clark and Sefton 2001; Cox and Deck 
2006;  Bohnet  2007;  Innocenti  and  Pazienza  2006),  others  have  found  that  women  are  more 
reciprocal than men (Croson and Buchan 1999; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007; Snijders and 
Keren, 2001; Buchan et al., 2008; Schwieren and Sutter 2008; Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996, 2008).  
                                                 
5 Holt and Laury (2002) find that women were more risk averse than men in low-payoff decisions; instead there were no 
sex differences in high-payoff decisions. 
6 In their experiments, Holt and Laury find that risk taking depends on the size of the probabilities for the lotteries’ 
larger outcomes. Women are more risk averse in decisions with large probabilities in the gain domain and in decisions 
with small and medium probabilities in the loss domain. 6 
 
Croson  and  Geezy  (2009)  explain  these  inconsistent  gender  differences  with  a  greater 
responsiveness of women to experiment conditions, that is, to differences in economic variables 
such  as  the  size  of  the  payoffs,  the  price  of  altruism,  or  the  repetition  of  the  game,  and 
psychological  variables  like  the  amount  of  anonymity  between  counterparts  and  the  amount  of 
anonymity between the participant and the experimenter.  
Gendered differences on inequity aversion are less ambiguous since most of the literature on 
inequality aversion and gender differences (Guth et al., 2007; Eckel and Grossman,1998; Bolton 
and Katok, 1995; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002; Selten and 
Ockenfels,1998  and  Dufwenberg  and  Muren,  2006)  shows  that,  while  men  choose  efficient 
allocations, women are more inequality averse, preferring equal splits and more generous sharing 
rules when involved in dictators or ultimatum games.  
These results on female inequity aversion seem to be confirmed by studies on gender preferences 
for  redistribution,  finding  that  women  tend  to  be  more  in  favour  of  redistribution  or  equal 
allocations than men (Durante and Putterman, 2007; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Major et al., 1989; 
Asdigian et al., 1994; Walker, 1989; Major and Adams, 1983). 
Another factor which has been extensively studied is whether and why women and men react 
differently to the competitive environments with results mainly documenting that women tend to be 
more  competition  averse.  Some  studies  found  that  men  perform  better  under  competition  than 
women do (Gneezy et al., 2003; Geezy and Rustichini, 2004), while those focused on what happens 
when participants can choose incentive schemes, find that under the option between “piece rate or a 
winner-take-all tournament” compensation scheme, women significantly prefer the first (Niederle 
and Vesterlund, 2007). Similarly, several other studies suggest that women are less likely to choose 
to compete (Garratt et al., 2011; Vandegrift and Brown, 2005; Gupta et al. 2005) or to engage in a 
negotiation  (Babcock  and  Laschever,  2003;  Small  et  al.,  2007;  Bowles  et  al.  2005;  Barryand 
Rynes,1991;  Kray  et  al.,  2001  and  2002;  Stuhlmacher a n d  W a l t e r s ,  1 9 9 9 ) .  E x p e r i m e n t a l  7 
 
contributions reveal different explanations for the females’ lower inclination to compete, such as 
their tendency to underestimate their ability, greater aversion to risk and uncertainty about their own 
ability  (Garratt  et  al.,  2011).  Another  explanation o f  t h i s  d i f f e r e n t  b e h a v i o r  i n  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  
concerns the idea that societal structures affect these observed gender differences and that “nurture 
matters.” (Bowles et al., 2007; Gneezy et al., 2006). On the opposite way, other studies argues that 
“nature” is important as well and genetic or hormonal differences could cause women to be less 
competitive than men (Colarelli et al., 2006; Bateup et al., 2002; Manning and Taylor, 2001). 
Our study contributes to this literature by analyzing if a gender effect arises when subjects are 
asked to choose a criterion in order to allocate resources within a society. Furthermore, after testing 
and rejecting the null hypothesis of no gendered differences, it exploits the richness of the design in 
order to discriminate among different preference drivers (among those considered above) of the 
observed findings. 
 
In this respect, the paper closest to ours is by Durante and Putterman (2007). These authors give 
subjects the opportunity to choose a tax rate in order to affect an income distribution which may be 
initially determined by four different methods: random, the average income of the place of origin, 
performance in a general SAT-like knowledge quiz and performance in a game of skill played 
through the computer (“Tetris”). They show that women reveal higher preference for redistribution 
than men both when acting as impartial spectators and when their payoff depends on their decisions. 
With reference to this specific study, our contribution is novel in that it combines direct choice of 
allocation criteria with task performance under a variety of situations (with/without information 
about payoffs, stakeholder/spectator position). The opportunity to modify a distribution by asking 
subjects to choose a tax rate (such as in Durante and Putterman 2007) allows people to correct 
distributions perceived as unfair. By contrast, our experiment allows us to investigate a parallel 8 
 
unexplored issue since we directly verify the preferred criterion people select to allocate a sum 
within a group.  
 
3.  Experimental design 
In this section we illustrate in depth our experimental design by presenting the different tasks on 
which  allocation  criteria  are  based  and  the  different  possible  positions  of  players  (spectators/ 
stakeholders with/without information about payoff distribution across criteria). A further section 
briefly describes the socio-demographic questionnaire.  
3.1 Tasks and criteria 
The central task characterizing the experiment is to distribute a sum of money (S) among N 
participants. We planned sessions involving 15 participants and S=210 euro. In a few cases, because 
of lack of subjects, we had sessions with 14 subjects and S=196 or 13 subjects and S=182 (see 
figure 1b for details on subjects and sessions across treatments). Players have to decide how to 
allocate the sum by choosing among seven criteria. 
Criterion 1  - LUCK. This criterion is based on a random draw. A number between 1 and 100 is 
randomly drawn for each participant by using the computer. The part of the total sum received by 
each participant is proportional to the share of her number with respect to the sum of the numbers 
extracted. 
Criterion 2 - EQUAL. The sum is equally shared among participants.  
Criterion 3 - EFFORT. Players are asked to copy information about fictitious students (enrolment 
number, name, surname and mark) into a file. The computer signals mistakes and waits until data 
are correctly copied. Each subject receives part of the sum that is proportional to the share of the 
number of copied data with respect to the total copied data by all participants. 9 
 
Criterion 4 - TALENT. Players are asked to perform some tasks taken from the WAIS-R test
7  as 
well  as  Raven’s  matrices.  Each  player  receives  part o f  t h e  s u m  t h a t  i s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  h e r  
performance in solving the tasks.
8 
Criterion 5 - PROTECTION+LUCK. According to this criterion, 30% of the sum is equally 
allocated among participants, while the remaining part is distributed through random draw (as in 
criterion 1).  
Criterion 6 - PROTECTION+EFFORT. According to this criterion, 30% of the sum is equally 
allocated  among  participants,  while  the  remaining  part  is  distributed  on  the  basis  of  subjects’ 
relative performance on the previously described secretarial task (as in criterion 3).  
Criterion 7 - PROTECTION+TALENT. According to this criterion, 30% of the sum is equally 
allocated  among  participants,  while  the  remaining  part  is  distributed  on  the  basis  of  subjects’ 
relative performance on the task previously described in relation to criterion 4.  
The seven criteria mimic different ideas of redistribution and, in particular, are characterized by 
different levels of protection.  
a)  Criteria LUCK, EFFORT and TALENT mimic scenarios where luck and/or meritocracy 
determine economic success. Moreover, they do not include any protection for subjects with poor 
performance (that is, there is no guaranteed minimum payoff for players who potentially could 
obtain a payoff equal to 0 in the distributive game).  
b)  The  three  mixed  criteria  –  PROTECTION+LUCK,  PROTECTION+EFFORT  and 
PROTECTION+TALENT  –  mimic  a  situation  in  which  luck o r  m e r i t o c r a c y  a f f e c t  w e a l t h  
differences, but each citizen is provided the basic needs.  
                                                 
7 The tasks are: finding missing details in pictures, putting in the right order some pictures in order to create stories with 
logical meaning, identifying the analogies between different pairs of words. 
8 We regard the secretarial task and the psychological test as proxies of (untalented) effort and talent respectively, even 
though  we are aware that: i) it is  not possible to exclude that ability and writing speeds required to perf orm  th e 
secretarial task are not affected by innate talent; ii) it is reasonable to assume that a certain level of effort is required for 
a good performance in the psychological test. Our choice of Raven’s matrices and WAIS R-tests for the latter is based 
on the fact that in the psychological literature these tools are considered among the best to measure innate talent (Raven, 
2000). 10 
 
c)  The  EQUAL  criterion  generates  a  perfectly  egalitarian  situation  where  subjects  receive 
exactly the same amount of money. 
3.2 The treatments 
The experiment is characterized by three treatments – STAKE, INFOSTAKE and SPECTATOR. 
They differ for the level of information or the involvement of subjects who select the criterion to be 
used in order to allocate the sum (see Figures 1a). In all treatments subjects are informed that each 
participant is asked to indicate her preferred criterion, but at the end of the session only one player 
will be randomly selected by the computer and her choice implemented. 
In  the  STAKE  treatment,  subjects  choose  the  criterion  a  first  time  under  ignorance  of  their 
payoffs and can revise it after information about them. In the first stage they are instructed about the 
seven  available  criteria.  Before  choice,  participants  are  provided  some  examples  of  both  the 
secretarial task and the quiz aimed at measuring their capabilities. In the second stage, participants 
are asked to select the criterion they want to use in order to allocate the sum (STAKE EX ANTE). 
After their decision, they take part in the activities – they perform the quiz for 15 minutes and the 
secretarial task for further 15 minutes – while the random drawn is made by the computer. Then, 
results  are  provided:  each  player  is  informed  about h e r  r e l a t i v e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  
activities and on the complete payoffs distribution for each possible criterion. This means that each 
subject knows her position within the group for each possible criterion. In the third stage, players 
have the opportunity to either confirm their previous (STAKE EX ANTE) choice or to change the 
previously  selected  criterion (STAKE EX POST).
9 After that, the computer draws the decisive  
player, her ex post selected criterion is applied and the payoffs are shown.  
In the INFOSTAKE treatment, subjects choose the criterion under perfect information. The only 
difference  with  respect  to  the  STAKE  treatment  is  that,  after  reading  the  instructions,  players 
                                                 
9 Notice that the we name “STAKE EX ANTE” and “STAKE EX POST” two specific choice conditions within the 
STAKE treatment 11 
 
directly take part to the activities and choose the preferred criterion only after being informed about 
their actual ranking in each possible scenario.  
Two types of participants (A-players and B-players) take part in the SPECTATOR treatment. A-
players have to allocate a sum among N B-players. After reading the instructions, A and B-players 
take part to different activities. B-players perform both the quiz and the secretarial task. A-players 
choose a criterion to allocate the sum among B-players both before (SPECTATOR EX ANTE) and 
after  knowing  B-players’  payoffs  distribution  (SPECTATOR  EX  POST  –  also  in  this  case 
“SPECTATOR EX ANTE” and “SPECTATOR EX POST” represent two conditions within the 
SPECTATOR treatment). All the players know that A-players’ decision affect B-players’ payoffs 
only. Also in these conditions (SPECTATOR EX ANTE and EX POST) one A-player is randomly 
drawn at the end of the session and her choice is implemented.  
In each treatment, before exiting the session, players take part in a typical Holt and Laury lottery 
and their propensity/aversion to risk is elicited. Finally, before receiving their payment, subjects fill 
in a socio-demographic questionnaire. These last two activities provide an extra payment. They are 
not pre-announced in order to avoid possible influence on players’ decisions. We elicit beliefs about 
personal  rank  in  the  payoff  distribution  in  three  sessions  out  of  six  in  the  STAKE  and  
SPECTATOR  treatment  sessions  (in  the  SPECTATOR  treatment  from  B-players  only).  More 
specifically, we ask subjects to declare how many players they think will have a better performance 
than  themselves  under  each  possible  criterion  and  pay  them  on  their  beliefs  concerning  the 
implemented criterion through the Quadratic Scoring Rule method
10. 
3.3 The questionnaire 
At the end of the experiment subjects fill in a structured questionnaire of 69 questions on socio-
economic aspects. The survey collects information about: a) socio-demographic characteristics (e.g.  
                                                 
10 The quadratic scoring rule associated with belief elicitation is widely employed in experimental economics (see for 
instance Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Offerman et al.,1996 and 2009; Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, 1985; Holt, 1986; 
Selten, 1998; Huck and Weizsacker, 2002). 12 
 
sex, nationality, number of family members, etc.); b) social status ( family income, education etc.); 
c) social capital (intended as trust – both generalized and specific trust towards some institutions 
such as banks, the judicial system, etc., networks – e.g. number of friends, etc. -, and civicness
11 – 
e.g. political participation etc.); d) risk aversion. Compilation of the questionnaire lasts on average 
30 minutes. 
3.4 The payoffs  
Players in the STAKE and in the INFOSTAKE treatment and B-players in the SPECTATOR 
treatment receive a payoff that consists of three elements: i) the part of the sum that the player 
receives  on  the  basis  of  the  implemented  criterion; i i )  t h e  a m o u n t  r e c e i v e d  f o r  f i l l i n g  i n  t h e  
questionnaire; iii) the amount  received as the result of the Holt and Laury’s lottery. Players who 
participated in the three sessions out of six in the STAKE treatment where beliefs have been elicited 
and B–players in the SPECTATOR treatment have been paid also in relation to belief elicitation. 
For A-players in the SPECTATOR treatment the payoff consists of a show-up fee (7€ ), the amount 
received for filling in the questionnaire (3€ ) and the amount  received as the result of the Holt and 
Laury’s lottery. 
3.5 The procedure 
Overall,  265  undergraduate  students  of  the  University  of  Milano-Bicocca  (distributed  as  in 
Figure 1b) took part in the experiment,. No student participated in more than one session. We ran all 
the sessions at the Experimental Economic Lab (EELAB) of the University of Milano-Bicocca, 
Italy.  Performance  and  decisions  are  recorded  through  the  computer  and  the  experiment  is 
programmed and conducted with Z-tree.
12  
Subjects entered the Lab and took a seat in front of a computer. Instructions were read aloud by 
an experimenter and read by participants on their computer screen. They were handed out too, in 
                                                 
11 Our civicness questions are taken from the well known Knack and Kiefer (1997) measures of social capital. 
12 The program was written by Dr. Marie-Edith Bissey (the programmer of the AL.EX). 13 
 
order to let people refresh the criteria before making their decisions. A set of control questions was 
asked in order to be sure that subjects understood the rules of the game when taking decisions. 
The average duration of the experiment was 1 hour and a half for the STAKE and INFOSTAKE 
treatments  and  2  hours  for  the  SPECTATOR  treatment. T h e  e x p e r i m e n t  p r e s e r v e d  a n o n y m i t y  
among players.  
 
4.  Our research hypotheses 
Based  on  the  above  mentioned  literature  findings,  our  main  research  hypothesis  is  that  the 
relatively higher risk, inequity and competition aversion induces women to prefer relatively more 
criteria involving some form of protection. More specifically, we formulate for empirical testing a 
general hypothesis on the gendered preference for protection and three related hypotheses which, 
given our design, may help us to discriminate the preference factors explaining our main result.  
H0: there is no significant difference between males and females in the preference for protection, 
that is, no difference occurs between the two sexes in the sum of the percentage of subjects who 
chose criteria involving some form of protection. 
More formally, if:  
∑P=∑EQ+∑PE+∑PT+∑PL 
where ∑P is the sum of the percentage of subjects who chose equal (EQ), protection plus effort 
(PE), protection plus talent (PT) and protection plus luck criteria (PL):  
H0:∑PM=∑PF. 
where the M and F subscripts indicate male and female gender. This hypothesis is verified by 
testing the null of no difference between males and females in terms of the sum of the four choices. 
The test is run on the five different positions of allocators (stakeholders/spectators without/with 
information about payoff distribution under different criteria plus ex ante informed stakeholders). 14 
 
In case the null is rejected the specific design of our experiment may help us to check the role of 
the three main alternative explanations already considered in the literature: i) risk aversion; ii) 
competition aversion; iii) inequity aversion.  
In order to verify the role of these factors, we formulate the following additional hypotheses.  
HoA: risk aversion explains the gendered difference in protection. 
A significant difference between males and females in the preference for protection would be 
consistent with risk aversion (where for risk aversion we intend aversion to the variability of one’s 
own  payoff) if the three following conditions are met: 
i)  women  choose  significantly  more  than  men  criteria  involving  protection  when  they  are 
stakeholders  without  information  about  relative  payoffs  under  different  criteria  or: 
∑PF(st.v)>∑PM(st.v) (where the subscript (st) stands for the stakeholder position of the decision 
maker and (v) for the absence of information);  
ii)  women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when they 
are stakeholders who have information about payoffs or: ∑PF(st.nv)=∑PM(st.nv) (where (nv) 
stands for a decision maker position with information);  
iii) women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when they 
are spectators
13 or: ∑PM(sp.)=∑PF(sp.)  (where (sp) stands for spectators). 
The second additional hypothesis is: 
H0B: competition aversion explains the gendered difference in protection. 
The problem here is more complex since we need to establish whether women:  
A) do not like to compete (self-centred competition aversion);  
B) do not like in general that people compete (generalized competition aversion)
14 ; 
                                                 
13 Choices under the condition of spectators do not involve any effects on allocators’ payoffs. As a consequence the 
gendered preference for protection in this case cannot be attributed to risk aversion. 15 
 
C) are ideologically against the idea that their results should depend from competition (self-centred 
ideological competition aversion);  
D)  are  ideologically  against  the  idea  that  results  of  anyone  should  depend  from  competition 
(generalised ideological competition aversion). 
Based on these definitions, a gender effect related to the preference for protection would be 
consistent with self-centred competition aversion (case A) if the following  three conditions are 
verified:  
i)  women choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when they 
are  stakeholders  without  information  about  payoff  distribution  under  different 
criteria or: ∑PF(st.v)>∑PM(st.v);  
ii)  women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when 
they are spectators or: PM(sp.)=∑PF(sp.). 
iii)  women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when 
they are stakeholders with information about payoff distribution across criteria or 
∑PF(st.nv)=∑PM(st.nv) ;  
 
Alternatively, for consistency with generalised competition aversion (case B), the following two 
conditions should be verified:  
i)  women  choose  significantly  more  than  men  criteria  involving  protection  when  they  are 
stakeholders without information about payoffs or: ∑PF(st.v)>∑PM(st.v);  
ii)  women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when they 
are stakeholders with payoff information or: ∑PF(st.nv)=∑PM(st.nv); 
15 
                                                                                                                                                                  
14 Generalized competition aversion may be the result of individual competition aversion being common knowledge and 
altruism. If an individual is personally averse to competition, believes that also other players are, and has other players’ 
payoff in her utility function then we fall into generalized competition aversion. 
15 Note that cases A (self-centred competition aversion) and B (generalized competition aversion) are observationally 
equivalent. 16 
 
iii) women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when they 
are spectators ∑PM(sp.)=∑PF(sp.).   
 
This is because generalized competition aversion implies that a player chooses protection if her 
choice reduces the probability that players actually run competitive races or suffer from the fact that 
their  payoffs  will  depend  from  competition.  This  is t h e  c a s e  o n l y  w h e n  d e c i s i o n  p l a y e r s  a r e  
stakeholders but not when they are spectators. If a player is a stakeholder and selects a criterion 
involving protection she knows that this will reduce the probability that results will depend on 
competition. On the other hand, if she is a spectator, her decision will not be known to the players 
who perform the tasks in the SPECTATOR treatment (B-players). As a consequence, spectators’ 
decision will not affect B-players’ beliefs about how much their payoff will depend on competition 
in the tasks and, consequently, it will not be able to avoid the disutility associated with competition 
for them. 
For  consistency  with  ideological  self-centred  competition  aversion ( c a s e  C )  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
conditions should be verified:  
i)  women  choose  significantly  more  than  men  criteria  involving  protection  when  they  are 
stakeholders  (with  or  without  information  about  payoffs  under  different  criteria) o r :  
∑PF(st.)>∑PM(st.);  
ii)  women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when they 
are  spectators  (with  or  without  information  about  payoffs  under  different  criteria) o r :  
∑PM(sp.)=∑PF(sp.). 
Finally, for consistency with ideological generalised competition aversion (case D) the gendered 
preference for protection should apply to all treatments or: ∑PF(.)>∑PM(.). 
The third additional hypothesis is: 17 
 
HoC: a form of inequity aversion explains the gendered difference in protection  
Again, we need to establish here whether women:  
A) are self-centred inequity averse
16 (self-centred inequity aversion);  
B)  do  not  like  that  them  or  also  others  find  themselves  in  an  unequal  payoff  distribution 
(generalised inequity aversion)
17.  
In case (A), women suffer more than men for eventual differences between their own and other 
players’ payoff. In particular, considering two standard models of inequity aversion, women suffer 
more than men i) when their payoff is either higher or lower than the payoff of the other players, 
with more disutility due to the presence of better-off subjects (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999); ii) when 
their payoff is different from the average payoff (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).  
The difference is that in the model by Fehr and Schmidt a player compares her payoff to each of 
the other players. Consequently, subjects’ utility decreases as the distribution of payoffs diverges 
from the egalitarian distribution. In the model by Bolton and Ockenfels the comparison is with the 
average income.  
More specifically, according to Fehr and Schmidt, each subject i compares her own payoff to the 
payoff of each other subject, being her utility function: 
























where: x is the individual payoff, αi is a parameter of envy, βi is a parameter of altruism and 0 < βi<1 and 
αi > βi , since the disutility that comes from a position of disadvantage is higher than the disutility that 
comes from a position of advantage
18; 
If the model by Fehr and Schmidt holds, we need that: 
                                                 
16 In what follows, for “self-centred inequity averse players” we will intend players whose utility decreases when the 
difference between their own and the other players’ payoff increases. 
17 F o r  “ n o n - s e l f - c e n t r e d  i n e q u i t y  a v e r s e  p l a y e r s ”  w e  therefore  intend  players  whose  utility  decreases  when  the 
difference both between their own and the other players’ payoff and among the other players’ payoffs increases. 
18 Note that:  0 ≥ ∂ ∂ j i x U  iff  j i x x ≥  since an increase in other people’s income is positive if and only if they have a 
lower level of income with respect to subject i. For a more detailed explanation of the parameters see Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), pp. 823-4. 
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i)   women  choose  significantly  more  than  men  the  equal  distribution  when  they  are 
stakeholders (with or without payoff information)  or ∑EQF(st.)>∑EQM(st.); 
ii)  women do not choose significantly more than men protection when they are spectators (with 
or without payoff information) or: ∑PF(sp.)=∑PM(sp.).  
This is due to the fact that: i) when inequity averse women are stakeholder, they maximize their 
utility if the sum is equally distributed among subjects, no matter their real or expected relative 
performance; ii) inequity aversion cannot explain women’s preference for protection when they are 
spectators since spectators’ decision on the distributive criterion does not affect their own payoff.  
According to Bolton and Ockenfels, subject i’s motivation function
19 is: 



















where σ is the inequality parameter which enters negatively the utility function. 
If the model by Bolton and Ockenfels holds, the following conditions should be verified: 
i)   women  choose  significantly  more  than  men  the  equal  distribution  when  they  are 
stakeholders and think their performance in the different activities is under the average 
standard or ∑EQF(st.)>∑EQM(st.); 
ii)  women  choose  significantly  more  than  men  criteria  involving  protection  when  they  are 
stakeholders and think their performance in the different activities is above the average 
standard or ∑PF(st.)>∑PM(st.); 
iii)  women do not choose significantly more than men criteria involving protection when they 
are spectators or: ∑PF(sp.)=∑PM(sp).  
                                                 
19 Bolton and Ockenfels call it motivation function to emphasize the fact that it represents the ‘objectives that motivate 
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For generalised (non-self-centred) inequity aversion we need that women choose significantly more 
than men criteria involving protection both when they are stakeholders or: ∑PF(st.)>∑PM(st.)  and 
spectators or: ∑PF(sp.)>∑PM(sp.). 
 
5.  Experimental Evidence 
Here below we provide descriptive findings on our main variables, non parametric tests of our 
main and related hypotheses and an econometric robustness check. 
5.1 Descriptive findings on socio-demographic variables 
Tables 1 and 2 provide legend and summary descriptive findings (overall sample and gender 
split) for the main socio-demographic controls used in our empirical analysis for all participants to 
the experiments (including those in the spectator treatment who do not choose the criterion). The 
average household size is of 3.9 members for both males and females, while around 52% (60%) and 
68%  (65%)  of  males  (females)  have  respectively  a  mother  or  father  with  a  university  degree. 
Female students exhibit superior high school leaving  performance  with  around  83  (out  of  100) 
against the 78 male average. Average score at university exams is however the same (25) for both 
sexes (18 is pass and 30 the top mark according to the Italian grading system). Only around 5 
percent of experiment participants have an Erasmus
20 experience, while 19 percent of males declare 
that they have lived abroad for at least more than 1 month against 24 percent of women. 
Finally, in a restricted number of treatments we ask participants to formulate beliefs about their 
performance before knowing their relative ranking only in a few treatments. We therefore have only 
41 female and 60 male observations on this point. What we measure here is the difference between 
the expected and the actual ranking in any of the possible selected allocation criteria. Our findings 
demonstrate  that,  for  any  criterion  chosen,  males  are  always  slightly  more  overconfident  than 
                                                 
20 ERASMUS stands for European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students. The variable picks 
up students who have spent a semester in a foreign University 20 
 
females, with the maximum distance being equal to one position in the rank (in the effort plus 
protection criterion).  
To check balancing properties we start by verifying that there are no significant differences in 
the gender split between each of the three treatments and the rest of the treatments and find that this 
is the case (see Table 3, first line). In addition we verify whether, within each treatment, socio-
demographic variables are balanced between sexes and find that this is condition is met as well 
(Table 3).
21  
5.2 The results 
Our findings document that the null hypothesis of absence of a gender effect is rejected. We find 
that women prefer allocation criteria involving protection significantly more than men, even though 
this  evidence  is  confirmed  only  when  the  decision  is  made  without  information  about  payoff 
distribution  under  the  different  criteria,  regardless  of  player’s  direct  involvement  (in  both  the 
stakeholder and spectator position).  
5.2.1 Description. Figure 3 shows the gender differences in the choice of distribution criteria 
according to different conditions and roles of decision makers, while in Table 4 we test whether the 
observed gendered differences on allocation criteria at descriptive level are statistically significant. 
First of all, we document a huge difference between sexes for stakeholders without information 
about payoffs under different criteria (STAKE EX ANTE). The share of women choosing talent 
plus protection is about 27 points higher than that of males (46 against 19 percent), 11 points higher 
when choosing full egalitarianism and also slightly higher when choosing effort plus protection. 
When we sum these three differences we find that the gendered preference for protection generates 
overall  almost  a  40  percent  point  difference.  A  series  of  Chi  square  tests  confirm  that  the 
                                                 
21 For continuous variables  we test - through nonparametric statistics - between-subject differences in the  median 
(Mann-Whitney test), while for dichotomous variables we test the differences in proportions (Chi square test). 
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differences between sexes in choosing talent, talent plus protection and criteria which involve some 
form of protection are highly significant (p-value <0.01) for stakeholders without information about 
payoffs. The scenario changes once the information is provided (STAKE EX POST) - the gendered 
preference for protection falls to 9 points and it is no more significant at that level. This is due to a 
sharp drop in the gendered difference of the talent plus protection choice. Both men and women 
choose  significantly  more  luck  when  such  choice  maximizes  their  own  payoff.  The  difference 
between sexes on the fully egalitarian choice (more females than males) is the one which seems to 
be less affected by the presence/absence of information about payoffs under different criteria . 
These last findings are paralleled by an analogous lack of significance in gender differences for 
stakeholders who can take their first decision by being fully informed. In the treatment in which 
stakeholders choose only after having full information (INFOSTAKE) women still maintain a 9 
point lead in terms of criteria involving some form of protection but, surprisingly, are more in favor 
of talent than men. However, this difference too is not significant.  
Finally,  the  difference  among  sexes  in  the  choice  of  criteria  which  involve  some  form  of 
protection  is  confirmed  also  for  spectators  without ( b u t  n o t  w i t h )  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  p a y o f f  
distribution  across  different  criteria  (SPECTATOR  EX  ANTE).  In  fact,  the  overall  gendered 
difference in protection remains huge (around 32 points)  and statistically significant (Chi square 
test, p-value = 0.001).  
In the SPECTATOR EX POST condition, women choose significantly more frequently criteria 
that  involve  effort,  but  less  talent  (Chi  square  test,  p-value  =  0.056  and  p-value  =  0.042 
respectively).  
Note  that,  when  we  aggregate  fully  informed  choices ( s t a k e h o l d e r s  a n d  s p e c t a t o r s  w i t h  
information about payoffs) we have more observations and find that women reward significantly 
less effort (p-value = 0.012). On the other hand, by aggregating uninformed choices (stakeholders 
and  spectators  without  information  about  payoffs),  all  results  on  the  gendered  difference  in 22 
 
protection are reinforced and we also find a significantly stronger preference of women for full 
egalitarianism (p-value < 0.074).
22 
5.2.2 Econometric findings (robustness check). As a final check, we run probit regressions for 
both each j-th individual
23 and combined
24 criterion/a on the complete sample. In this way we may 
have a general idea of the overall impact of the gender effect net of the absence of information and 
of (net of) that of the given player’s position (stakeholder or spectator). Results are displayed in 
Tables 5.1 and 6.1.  
Our base probit specification is: 
CHOICEij=α0j + α1STAKEHOLDERij + α2EXANTEij + α3INFOSTAKEij +∑lγlCONTROLS l i j +εij            
(1) 
where  STAKEHOLDERkij  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  the  i-th  allocator  is  a  stakeholder 
(her/his payoff is affected by her/his decision); EXANTEkij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
choice is made without information; INFOSTAKEkij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the choice is 
made by an ex ante informed stakeholder; CONTROLS lij are socio-demografic controls and include: 
a gender dummy, age, the number of household members and a dummy for students having no 
brothers or sisters, the average score at university exam, the score at the school leaving exam, two 
dummies taking value one if the mother (the father) has at least a high school degree, a dummy for 
those attending religious services, a dummy for worker students, for those who volunteer and two 
discrete qualitative variables measuring the town size and income. By construction the benchmark 
for reading coefficient results is the presumed more impartial condition, that is, the condition of 
spectator with veil of ignorance. Note that the  INFOSTAKE  variable  may  also  be  read  as  the 
                                                 
22 The observed gendered difference seems to indicate that women prefer less unequal payoff distributions when they 
are under ignorance of relative payoffs under different criteria. This interpretation is reinforced if we analyze people’s 
choices through the Gini’s coefficient. In such case we find that women without payoff information – in the STAKE EX 
ANTE and in the SPECTATOR EX ANTE treatments – significantly opt for a more egalitarian society (p = 0.007 and p 
= 0.068 respectively). 
23 Luck, pure effort, pure talent, protection plus effort, protection plus talent and equal. 
24 Protection, at least effort, at least talent and desert 23 
 
interaction  between  the  stakeholder  and  the  presence  of  information  (which  is  not  exactly  the 
interaction between the STAKEHOLDER and the INFOSTAKE variable if we assume that for 
stakeholders receiving information after having chosen also without information  is not exactly the 
same as the presence of information from the beginning). 
General findings of estimates in Table 5.1 show that:  
i)  Receiving information ex post (i.e. after having also chosen without information) has 
positive and significant effects on luck and pure effort choices while reducing the protection 
plus talent choice;  
ii)  the condition of choosing ex ante by being already informed leads stakeholders to 
choose significantly less protection plus effort and more luck;  
iii)  the  stakeholder  condition  leads  to  choose  significantly  more  talent,  effort  and 
significantly less protection plus talent; 
iv)  the gender effect here is significant on choices involving protection plus talent (male 
gender reduces by 17 percent the probability of such choices). 
Estimates on combined criteria from Table 6.1 document that:  
i)  Receiving  information  (ex  post)  has  significant  and n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  o n  c h o i c e s  
involving protection, talent and desert; the condition of choosing ex ante by being already 
informed  leads  stakeholders  to  choose  significantly m o r e  p r o t e c t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  e f f o r t  a n d  
desert;   
ii)  the  stakeholder  condition  adds  to  it  an  independent n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o n  c h o i c e s  
involving protection; 
iii)  the gender effect here is significant on choices involving protection (male gender 
reduces by 26 percent the probability of such choices).  
In Tables 5.2 and 6.2 we interact the gender dummy with the treatment variables (receiving 
information, condition of ex ante informed stakeholder and stakeholder dummy). What we find here 24 
 
is that the interaction between the absence of information and the male gender leads to a 31 percent 
reduction in the probability of choosing criteria involving some form of protection. 
We now wonder whether the observed findings on gendered differences find correspondence in 
differences in questionnaire responses on civicness, inequity aversion and other questions on values 
(see Table 8). We therefore estimate a model in which the dependent variable is the extent of 
consensus to the value item in the questionnaire and explanatory factors are the gender dummy plus 
all standard socio-demographic controls. What we find here is that women declare significantly:  
i)  higher social capital by justifying significantly less actions such as evading taxes, 
jumping queues and failing to report when accidentally damaging a parked vehicle;  
ii)  higher inequity aversion by asking for a significantly higher redistribution of world 
income and being more in favour of a limit of wealth in order to contrast poverty;  
iii)  higher tendency to accept income distribution based on effort (Table 7).  
In  our  final  robustness  check  we  therefore  introduce in the specification tested in Table 6.2 
column 1 (where the dependent variable is protection), the answers to qualitative items on social 
capital, inequity aversion and justice and distribution criteria for which we have found a significant 
gender difference in Table 8. We find (Table 8) that the gender effect interacted with the absence of 
information (EXANTEMALE) remains positive and significant.  This  implies  that  the  relatively 
stronger  social  capital  and  inequity  aversion  expressed  by  women  in  the  questionnaire  are  not 
enough  to  explain  the  gender  preference  for  protection  or  that  such  preference  persists  after 
correcting for value judgments of participants to the experiment. 
5.2.3 Comments and interpretation on Hypothesis testing. Nonparametric tests reject our H 0 
hypothesis about of no difference between sexes concerning preferences for protection, at least 
when we look at the decision without information both when subjects are stakeholders (Table 4 
column 3) and when they act as impartial spectators (column 6). This tendency is also confirmed 25 
 
when  we  aggregate  different  conditions  by  distinguishing  between  choices  taken  under  full 
information (column 5) or under NO information (column 2). 
In  order  to  disentangle  among  different  possible  explanations  of  women’s  preferences  for 
protection, we consider our H0A – H0C hypotheses. 
Hypothesis  H0A  tells  us  that,  to  consider  risk  aversion  an  appropriate  explanation  of  this 
tendency, we should find the effect to disappear  in the spectator treatment when women’s choice of 
allocation criteria does not affect their own payoff. Since this is not the case, the experimental 
evidence confirms that risk aversion may not be taken as (the only) explanation for the decision of 
women to opt for protection significantly more than men. In fact, risk aversion cannot have any role 
in the spectator treatments.  
Hypothesis  H0B  takes  into  consideration  the  explanation  related  to c o m p e t i t i o n  a v e r s i o n  a n d  
considers four possible variants. None of them can be supported by our data. Women participating 
to our experiment are not characterized by neither self-centred nor generalised competition aversion 
since the gendered preference for protections exists also for spectators. They do not have a general 
ideological  aversion f o r  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  p a y o f f  c o u l d  b e  d e c i d e d  o n  t h e  b asis  of  a  competitive 
challenge since the gendered difference disappears once we provide information (ex post).  
Hypothesis  H0C  tells  us  that  they  are  characterised  by  neither  self-centred n o r  generalized 
inequity aversion. The first problem is that, according to the former, no gendered difference should 
exist among spectators, while the latter predicts a systematic difference in all cases. A second issue 
is that no change should occur when the information is provided (ex post) among stakeholders.  
The only possibility which is compatible with our findings is that women expect a level of 
inequality in payoffs which is above the one they verify after receiving information about payoffs 
under  different  criteria.  Hence  our  findings  can  be s t i l l  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  g e n e r a l i z e d  i n e q u a l i ty  
aversion under such assumption.  26 
 
Finally, consider that both Fehr and Schmidt’s theory and Bolton and Ockenfels’ model predict 
that  inequity-averse  subjects  should  prefer  the  equal  redistribution  of  resources  –  in  all  cases 
according to the former, in case of payoffs under the average according to the latter. On the other 
hand, our experimental evidence suggests that people prefer mixed criteria involving protection. 
However, we think this would not be  enough to completely reject the  hypothesis that inequity 
aversion  matters.  In  fact,  a  soft  interpretation  of s e l f - c e n t r e d  i n e q u i t y  a v e r s i o n  m o d e l s  w o u l d  
override this last objection. That is, if we consider that subjects are self-centred inequity averse 
concerning specific issues only. For instance, I do not want any difference in health and instruction 
provision, but I do not care whether a small sample can afford buying a big car. In that case, it 
would be possible that either protection plus effort, protection plus talent or protection plus luck are 
chosen by inequity-averse subjects.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
Do criteria of justice differ across sexes? In our randomized experiment with task performance 
we aim to answer this question. Participants to the experiment choose among  a multiplicity  of 
allocation criteria with different roles (stakeholders or spectators) without/with information about 
rankings and payoffs related to the different tasks. Based on the state of art of the literature of 
gender and preferences our main hypothesis is that relatively higher risk and inequity aversion,  
combined with lower overconfidence and competition aversion (typically found in this literature), 
all  move  toward  a  significantly  higher  women  preference  for  criteria  involving  some  form  of 
protection.  
We find strong empirical results in support of this assumption since the null of no gendered 
difference in the relative preference for protection is strongly rejected with both non parametric 
tests and econometric robustness checks which follow. The puzzle is that the gendered difference is 27 
 
significant for both stakeholders and spectators but only when they choose without information 
about payoff distribution under different criteria. 
We try to discriminate which preference structure may be compatible with our findings. We find 
that our results cannot be entirely explained neither by risk aversion (the gendered preference exists 
also for spectators), nor by competition aversion when we consider four different variants of it. The 
disappearance of the gendered effect for spectators and stakeholders when they receive information 
(ex post) might be however compatible with the assumption of aversion toward inequality which is 
discovered to be not too large after the information is provided (ex post) and women may observe 
payoff distribution. 
A main policy suggestions stemming from our experiment is that, the spectator condition and the 
absence  of  information  about  personal  payoffs  have  two  positive  independent  effects  on  the 
likelihood that individuals choose some form of protection and do not maximize their own interest 
when choosing allocation criteria. The gender effect adds an important qualification to this point. 
Appointing  women  for  taking  such  decision  has  a  third  important  and  independent  impact  if 
individual or political parties goal is to increase protection.  
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Figure 1b Experimental observations 
 
















Tot.  Female  Male 
STAKE 
87  35  52  15 subjects in 4 
sessions,  
14 in a session  
13 in a session 
YES  YES  YES for 42 
subjects 
INFOSTAKE 
59  22  37  15 subjects in 3 
sessions,  
14 in a session 
NO  YES  NO 
SPECTATOR 
SUBJECT A 
60  23  37  15 subjects in 4 
sessions 
15 subjects in 3 
sessions,  
14 in a session 
YES  YES  NO 
SPECTATOR 
SUBJECT B 
59  25  34   
-  -  YES 32 
 
Table 1 Variable legend 
Year   Year of birth  
Civic1 
 
Variable measuring how justifiable is, according to the respondent, enjoying public benefits without entitlements 
(it takes integer values from 1 to 10. The same is true for the following “Civic” variables) 
Male   Dummy variable (DV) taking value one if the respondent is a male  Civic2  Variable measuring how justifiable is, according to the respondent, avoiding a fare on public transport 
LoneChild  DV taking value one if the respondent has no brothers or sisters  Civic3  Variable measuring how justifiable is, according to the respondent, tax evasion 
House 
Members  Total number of respondent’s household members 
Civic4 
 
Variable measuring how justifiable is, according to the respondent, keeping money you obtain by accident when it would be 
the rightful owner  
Townsize 
 
Discrete qualitative variable for town size: 1:0-10.000 inhabitants; 
2:10.001-25.000 inhabitants; 3:25.001-50.000 inhabitants; 4:50.001-






Variable measuring how justifiable is, according to the respondent,  
failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle  
 
Variable measuring how justifiable, according to the respondent, is jumping queues 
Reader  
 
Variable  measuring how many times in a week the respondent reads 
newspapers  
(it takes integer values from 1 to 5).  Inequity1 
Variable measuring the general agreement of the respondent with several possible options of income redistribution  
(it takes integer values from 1 to 5 corresponding respectively to: 
 nothing, such  to reduce of 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%,  the difference between rich and poor people). 
Risk    
Variable measuring the general willingness of the respondent in taking 
risk (it takes integer values from 1 to 10)  Inequity2 
Variable measuring the general agreement of the respondent with several,  
increasing for higher income, possible options of tax rates (it takes integer values from 1 to 5). 
 Catholic   DV taking value one if the respondent is Catholic  Inequity3 
Variable measuring the general agreement of the respondent with a superior bound  
for the income of reach people until there are poorest people in the world (it takes integer values from 1 to 10). 
 Church 
Attendance 
Variable measuring how many times in a year the respondent usually 
attends a religious service  Naz1 
Variable measuring the general agreement  
of the respondent with giving more to whom contribute more at the total wealth (it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
 Volunteer    
DV taking value one if the respondent is engaged in social activities as 
volunteer   Naz2 
Variable measuring the general agreement with income distribution according to individual needs  
(it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
 Married 
Parents  DV taking value one if the respondent’s parents are married  Naz3 
Variable measuring the general agreement of the respondent that justice, fairness and equality  
are the most important feature of a society (it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
Mother 
Education 
DV taking value one if the respondent’s mother has at least high 
school education  Naz4 
Variable measuring the general moral agreement of the respondent with the fact that children of the rich inherit  
a lot of money and children of the poor nothing (it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
Father 
Education 
DV taking value one if the respondent’s father has at least high school 
education  Naz5 
Variable measuring the general agreement that managers must chosen among the best worker  
(it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
Income     Income level of the respondent’s household   Naz6 
Variable measuring the general agreement with income distribution based on effort 
(it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
 MathGrade  The average score of the respondent’s school leaving examination  Naz7 
Variable measuring the general agreement with equal splits among work team members 
(it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
 AvgExam 
Score  Average score of university exams  Naz8  Variable measuring the general agreement with job promotions based on  effort (it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
Erasmus     DV taking value one if the respondent has an Erasmus experience  Naz9 
Variable measuring the general agreement with giving more according to needs despite low effort  
(it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
LiveAbroad 
DV taking value one if the subject declared that she has lived abroad  
for at least more than 1 month in the past  Naz10 V a r i a b l e   m e a s u r i n g   t h e   g e n e r a l   a g r e e m e n t   w i t h   n o   h iring workers despite their needs(it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 
 Student 
Worker  DV taking value one if the student is also a worker  Naz11 
Variable measuring the general agreement of the respondent with equal split of a bonus among team members  
unrelated to their individual contributions/efforts (it takes integer values from 1 to 10) 33 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 f u l l   m a l e   female  full  male  female  full  male  female  full  female  full  male  female 
Year  265  160 1 0 5   1 9 8 7 . 2 8 7   1987.287  1987.6  2.604  2.92  2.003  1970  1970  1981  1991  1991  1991 
LoneChild  265  160  105  0.132  0.156  0.095  0.339  0.364 0 . 2 9 5   0   0   0   1   1   1  
House 
Members  265  160  105  3.894  3.944  3.819  1.344  1.299  1.413  1  1 1  1 1   1 1   1 0  
Town 
Size  265  160  105  3.298  3.337  3.238  1.842  1.836  1.858  1  1 1   6  6  6  
Reader  265  160  105  2.724  2.856  2.524  1.259  1.317  1.144  1  1  1  5  5  5 
Risk  262  159  103  5.935  5.924  5.951  1.938  1.874  2.041  1  1  1  10  10  10 
Catholic  261  157  104  0.636  0.675  0.577  0.482  0.47  0.496  0  0  0  1  1  1 
Church 
Attendance  264  160  104  2.189  2.237  2.115  1.246  1.1.60  1.16  1  1 1   5  5  5  
Volunteer  264  159  105  0.273  0.283  0.257  0.455  0.466 0 . 4 3 9   0   0   0   2   2   1  
Married 
Parents  261  159  102  0.87  0.899  0.823  0.337  0.302  0.383  0  0  0  1  1  1 
Mother 
HighEducation  265  160  105  0.619  0.681  0.523  0.486  0.467  0.502  0  0 0   1  1  1  
FatherHighEducation 265  160  105  0.634  0.65  0.609  0.483  0.478  0.49  0  0  0  1  1  1 
Income  253  156  97  2.549  2.647  2.391  1.059  1.064  1.036  1  1  1  5  5  5 
MathGrade  252  155  97  78.349  75.684  82.608  12.142  11.368  12.181  43  43  60  100  100  100 
AvgExamScore  258  158  100  25.05  24.594  25.77  3.281  3.721  2.264  20  20  20  30  30  30 
Erasmus  263  159  104  0.046  0.044  0.048  0.209  0.206  0.215  0  0  0  1  1  1 
LivAbroad  257  157  100  0.21  0.191  0.24  0.408  0.394  0.429  0  0  0  1  1  1 
Stud 
Worker  265  160  105  0.321  0.287  0.371  0.468  0.454  0.485  0  0 0   1  1  1  
civic1  264  159  105  2.379  2.339  2.438  2.391  2.348  2.464  1  1  1  10  10  10 
civic2  264  159  105  3.757  3.930  3.495  2.254  2.365  2.057  1  1  1  10  10  10 
civic3  264  159  105  2.276  2.540  1.876  1.857  2.110  1.298  1  1  1  10  10  6 
civic4  263  159  104  6.49  6.704  6.163  2.411  2.509  2.225  1  1  1  10  10  10 
civic5  264  159  105  3.25  3.566  2.771  2.059  2.174  1.777  1  1  1  10  10  8 
civic6  264  159  105  3.178  3.314  2.971  2.23  2.267  2.168  1  1  1  10  10  9 
inequity1  263  159  104  2.962  2.90  3.048  1.08  1.151  .9591  1  1  1  5  5  5 
inequity2  263  159  104  2.426  2.459  2.375  0.874  0.898  0 .838  1  1  1  4  4  4 
inequity3  264  159  105  5.784  5.320  6.485  2.91  3.017  2.598  1  1  1  10  10  10 
naz1  263  159  104  7.323  7.408  7.192  1.935  1.965  1.890  1  2  1  10  10  10 
naz2  263  159  104  6.825  6.798  6.865  1.793  1.844  1.718  1  1  3  10  10  10 
naz3  263  159  104  8.483  8.465  8.509  1.579  1.656  1.461  2  2  5  10  10  10 
naz4  264  160  104  5.67  5.53  5.884  2.61  2.691  2.478  1 1   1   1 0  1 0   1 0  
naz5  264  160  104  8.424  8.675  8.038  1.66  1.511  1.805 3   4   3   1 0  1 0  1 0  
naz6  264  160  104  8.117  7.962  8.355  1.624  1.678  1.513  2  2  4  10  10  10 
naz7  264  160  104  4.803  5.069  4.394  2.836  2.804  2.850  1  1  1  10  10  10 
naz8  264  160  104  8.007  7.937  8.115  1.737  1.714  1.775  1  1  2  10  10  10 
naz9  263  159  104  5.099  5.245  4.875  2.076  2.014  2.157  1  1  1  10  10  10 
naz10  263  159  104  5.304  5.559  4.913  2.165  2.145  2.145  1  1  1  10  10  10 
naz11  263  159  104  6.897  6.836  6.990  2.465  2.487  2.439  1  1  1  10  10  10 34 
 











Mann-Whitney or χ2 
test* 
H0: (1) = (2) 
(P-value) 
Mann-Whitney 
or χ2 test* 
H0: (1) = (3) 
(P-value) 
Mann-Whitney or  
χ2 test* 
H0: (2) = (3) 
(P-value) 
Male  0 .598  0.627  0.597  (0.721)  (0.817)  (0.906) 













































































































*For continuous variables we test - through nonparametric statistics - between-subject differences in the median (Mann-
















































































































































































Combination of choices 
Protection
 


































































*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   Chi square tests 
 
Full information= treatments where subjects have full information about their payoffs across criteria, that is the INFOSTAKE, the STAKE ex post and the SPECTATOR ex post treatments; 





Table 5.1 The effect of ignorance on payoff distribution and stakeholdership on players’ choices 
 ( 1 )   ( 2 )   ( 3 )   ( 4 )   ( 5 )   ( 6 )  
VARIABLES  Luck  Pure effort  Pure talent  Protection 
plus effort 
Protection 
plus talent  Equal 
EXANTE  -0.179***  -0.082**  -0.01  0.046  0.223***  -0.016 
 ( 0 . 0 4 5 )   ( 0 . 0 3 5 )   ( 0 . 0 4 7 )   ( 0 . 0 3 0 )   ( 0 . 0 4 9 )   ( 0 . 0 3 4 )  
INFOSTAKE  0.151*  -0.041  -0.014  -0.065***  -0.067  -0.019 
 ( 0 . 0 8 3 )   ( 0 . 0 3 9 )   ( 0 . 0 7 2 )   ( 0 . 0 2 0 )   ( 0 . 0 6 6 )   ( 0 . 0 4 1 )  
STAKEHOLDER  0.028  0.095***  0.133**  -0.007  -0.286*** 0 . 0 4 3  
 ( 0 . 0 6 2 )   ( 0 . 0 3 4 )   ( 0 . 0 5 5 )   ( 0 . 0 3 0 )   ( 0 . 0 8 5 )   ( 0 . 0 3 3 )  
Male  0.086  0.039  0.072  -0.01  -0.175***  -0.036 
 ( 0 . 0 5 3 )   ( 0 . 0 3 4 )   ( 0 . 0 5 8 )   ( 0 . 0 3 0 )   ( 0 . 0 6 4 )   ( 0 . 0 4 3 )  
Observations  267  244  267  254  267  267 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressors include the following variables as listed in Table 2: Year, Male, LoneChild, HouseMembers,Townsize, Reader,  Risk  
Catholic, ChurchAttendance, Volunteer, MarriedParents, MotherEducation, FatherEducation, Income,   MathGrade, 
AvgExamScore, Erasmus, LivAbroad, StudentWorker. 
 
 
Table 5.2 The effect of ignorance and stakeholdership on players’ choices 
 ( 1 )   ( 2 )   ( 3 )   ( 4 )   ( 5 )   ( 6 )  
VARIABLES  Luck  Pure effort  Pure talent  Protection 
plus effort 
Protection 
plus talent  Equal 
EXANTE  -0.254***  -0.160**  -0.121  0.069  0.343***  -0.017 
 ( 0 . 0 9 0 )   ( 0 . 0 7 1 )   ( 0 . 0 8 8 )   ( 0 . 0 4 7 )   ( 0 . 0 8 9 )   ( 0 . 0 5 4 )  
INFOSTAKE  0.071  -0.053  0.021  0.006  -0.046  -0.027 
 ( 0 . 1 2 7 )   ( 0 . 0 6 6 )   ( 0 . 1 2 7 )   ( 0 . 0 9 1 )   ( 0 . 1 2 1 )   ( 0 . 0 6 2 )  
EXANTEMALE  0.144  0.164  0.19  -0.018  -0.130**  0.003 
 ( 0 . 1 6 1 )   ( 0 . 1 4 3 )   ( 0 . 1 3 5 )   ( 0 . 0 5 3 )   ( 0 . 0 5 4 )   ( 0 . 0 7 3 )  
INFOMALE  0.111  0.035  -0.055    -0.023  0.016 
 ( 0 . 1 7 2 )   ( 0 . 1 4 0 )   ( 0 . 1 2 7 )    ( 0 . 1 5 4 )   ( 0 . 1 1 1 )  
STAKEHOLDER  0.012  0.095  0.260***  -0.066  -0.239*  0.047 
 ( 0 . 1 0 7 )   ( 0 . 0 6 5 )   ( 0 . 0 7 9 )   ( 0 . 0 8 5 )   ( 0 . 1 3 6 )   ( 0 . 0 5 3 )  
STAKEHOLDERMA
LE  0.022  -0.006  -0.261*  0.093  -0.059  -0.008 
 ( 0 . 1 3 1 )   ( 0 . 1 1 8 )   ( 0 . 1 5 5 )   ( 0 . 1 0 4 )   ( 0 . 1 1 9 )   ( 0 . 0 8 5 )  
Male  0.022  0.006  0.206*  -0.034  -0.033  -0.033 
 ( 0 . 1 0 8 )   ( 0 . 1 0 6 )   ( 0 . 1 1 0 )   ( 0 . 0 7 4 )   ( 0 . 1 1 1 )   ( 0 . 0 9 1 )  
Observations  267  244  267  222  267  267 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressors  include  the  following  variables  as  listed  in  Table  2:  Year,  Male,  LoneChild,  HouseMembers,Townsize, 
Reader,  Risk  Catholic, ChurchAttendance, Volunteer, MarriedParents, MotherEducation, FatherEducation, Income,   













Table 6.1 The effect of ignorance and stakeholdership on combined players’ choices 
 ( 1 )   ( 2 )   ( 3 )   ( 4 )  
VARIABLES  Protection  At least effort  At least talent  Desert 
EXANTE  0.282***  -0.030  0.242***  0.223*** 
 ( 0 . 0 6 3 )   ( 0 . 0 4 6 )   ( 0 . 0 6 0 )   ( 0 . 0 5 7 )  
INFOSTAKE  -0.150  -0.133**  -0.046  -0.174* 
 ( 0 . 0 9 6 )   ( 0 . 0 5 4 )   ( 0 . 0 9 9 )   ( 0 . 0 9 7 )  
STAKEHOLDER  -0.284***  0.083  -0.177*  -0.09 
 ( 0 . 0 8 2 )   ( 0 . 0 5 4 )   ( 0 . 0 9 4 )   ( 0 . 0 8 5 )  
Male  -0.275***  0.018  -0.08  -0.045 
 ( 0 . 0 7 5 )   ( 0 . 0 5 2 )   ( 0 . 0 8 6 )   ( 0 . 0 7 8 )  
Observations  267  267  267  267 
 Regressors include the following variables as listed in Table 2: Year, Male, LoneChild, HouseMembers, 
 Townsize, Reader,  Risk  Catholic, ChurchAttendance, Volunteer, MarriedParents, MotherEducation, 
 FatherEducation, Income,   MathGrade, AvgExamScore, Erasmus, LivAbroad, StudentWorker. 
 
Table 6.2 The effect of veil of ignorance and stakeholdership on combined players’ choices 
 ( 1 )   ( 2 )   ( 3 )   ( 4 )  
VARIABLES  Protection  At least effort  At least talent  Desert 
        
EXANTE  0.483***  -0.059  0.301***  0.257*** 
 ( 0 . 1 1 4 )   ( 0 . 0 8 0 )   ( 0 . 1 0 2 )   ( 0 . 0 9 5 )  
INFOSTAKE  -0.068  -0.098  0.036  -0.057 
 ( 0 . 1 6 6 )   ( 0 . 1 0 6 )   ( 0 . 1 6 5 )   ( 0 . 1 5 4 )  
STAKEHOLDER  -0.401**  0.006  -0.033  -0.032 
 ( 0 . 1 4 3 )   ( 0 . 0 9 7 )   ( 0 . 1 5 0 )   ( 0 . 1 5 0 )  
EXANTEMALE  -0.312**  0.049  -0.097  -0.061 
 ( 0 . 1 3 3 )   ( 0 . 1 0 8 )   ( 0 . 1 2 6 )   ( 0 . 1 3 6 )  
INFOMALE  -0.135  -0.063  -0.131  -0.182 
 ( 0 . 1 9 8 )   ( 0 . 1 4 0 )   ( 0 . 1 9 7 )   ( 0 . 2 0 9 )  
STAKEHOLDERMALE  0.187  0.133  -0.219  -0.093 
 ( 0 . 2 0 2 )   ( 0 . 1 3 2 )   ( 0 . 1 8 6 )   ( 0 . 1 8 9 )  
Male  -0.239  -0.09  0.135  0.073 
 ( 0 . 1 5 9 )   ( 0 . 1 2 8 )   ( 0 . 1 6 8 )   ( 0 . 1 7 2 )  
Observations  267  267  267  267 
Regressors include the following variables as listed in Table 2: Year, Male, LoneChild, HouseMembers, 
 Townsize, Reader,  Risk  Catholic, ChurchAttendance, Volunteer, MarriedParents, MotherEducation, 




Table 7. Gender effect related to different socio-economic variables 
Questions  Coeff  Std.Dev. 
Civicness (all these variables take integer values from 1 to 10)    
Civic1: How justifiable is, according to the respondent, enjoying public benefits without entitlements   -0.036  0.217 
Civic2: How justifiable is, according to the respondent, avoiding a fare on public transport   0.245  0.276 
Civic3: How justifiable is, according to the respondent, tax evasion   0.721**  0.333 
Civic4: How justifiable is, according to the respondent, keeping money you obtain by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner   0.476*  0.251 
Civic5: How justifiable is, according to the respondent, failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle  0.747***  0.269 
Civic6: How justifiable, according to the respondent, is jumping queues   0.667***  0.259 
Inequity aversion    
Inequity1: Rate of redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor that the respondent would like to implement, if s/he could, by choosing between 5 
possibilities: 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% (it takes integer values from 1 to 5). 
-0.228***  0.312 
Inequity2: Tax rate system chosen by the respondent among four systems characterized by different level of tax progressiveness (it takes integer values from 
1 – the less progressive taxation system - to 5 – the more progressive taxation system). 
0.368  0.234 
Inequity3: Level of agreement with the following statement, using a 10 level scale: “A limit to the wealth that may be accumulated by the rich should exist 
until poverty will be eliminated” 
-0.692***  0.208 
NAZ  
Variables that measure the level of agreement or disagreement with the different following statements (using a 10 level scale) 
  
Naz1: The more people contribute, the more they should receive  0.192  0.304 
Naz2: People who need more should receive more  0.120  0.377 
Naz3: Justice, equity and equality are the most important requisites of a society  0.156  0.277 
Naz4: It is not correct from the moral point of view that children of the rich inherit a lot of money and children of the poor nothing  -0.094  0.211 
Naz5: Employees who have the best performance should be more likely to be included in the top management of their organizations  0.973***  0.317 
Naz6: The salary should reflect the worker’s effort  -0.295  0.335 
Naz7: When students work in a team on a project, each member of the team should obtain the same mark, independently from the individual effort  0.379*  0.227 
Naz8: Decisions on promotions should be based on the effort made by the different employees in respect to their job  -0.103  0.223 
Naz9: Sometimes is ok giving a wage increase to the employee who is in need even though he is not the one who worked more hard  -0.057  0.225 
Naz10: It is always a bad idea to hire a person by simply considering if he needs the job or not   0.528**  0.224 
Naz11: When a bonus is given to a team, it should always been equally shared among the members 
 
-0.295  0.230 
The table reports coefficients and significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) of the gender dummy (male=1, female=0) in a specification in which the dependent variable is 
the extent of consensus to the value item in the questionnaire and explanatory factors are the gender dummy plus all sociodemographic controls from Tables 6.1-7.240 
 
 
Table 8. Robustness check on the significance of the gendered effect on protection when introducing 
questionnaire responses on value judgement for which there is a significant gender effect  
 
Dependent Variable= 1 if the allocator chooses full egalitarianism or talent plus protection or effort plus protection or 
luck plus protection  
        
EXANTE  0.486***  0.490***  0.496***  0.495***  0.497*** 
  (0.111)  (0.112)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.116) 
INFOSTAKE  -0.082  -0.068  -0.065  -0.098  -0.153 
  (0.168)  (0.166)  (0.171)  (0.171)  (0.160) 
STAKEHOLDER  -0.413***  -0.405***  -0.437***  -0.446***  -0.455*** 
  (0.133)  (0.134)  (0.132)  (0.128)  (0.136) 
EXANTEMALE  -0.338***  -0.340***  -0.346***  -0.344***  -0.341** 
  (0.129)  (0.130)  (0.131)  (0.131)  (0.134) 
INFOMALE  -0.159  -0.178  -0.206  -0.159  -0.141 
  (0.198)  (0.193)  (0.189)  (0.200)  (0.201) 
STAKEHOLDER
MALE  0.253  0.254  0.299*  0.331*  0.298 
  (0.182)  (0.181)  (0.177)  (0.176)  (0.191) 
Male  -0.247*  -0.240*  -0.274**  -0.278**  -0.234 
  (0.142)  (0.142)  (0.139)  (0.135)  (0.151) 
Civic3  -0.023        -0.015 
  (0.022)        (0.025) 
Civic5    -0.022      -0.030 
   ( 0 . 0 1 8 )       ( 0 . 0 2 0 )  
Inequity3     0 . 0 1 9     0 . 0 1 8  
     ( 0 . 0 1 3 )     ( 0 . 0 1 3 )  
Naz5       - 0 . 0 6 1 * *   - 0 . 0 6 1 * *  
       ( 0 . 0 2 7 )   ( 0 . 0 2 7 )  
Naz10         0 . 0 4 7 * *  
         ( 0 . 0 2 0 )  
Observations  293  293  292  293  292 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regressors  include  the  following  variables  as  listed  in  Table  2:  Year,  Male,  LoneChild,  HouseMembers,Townsize, 
Reader,  Risk  Catholic, ChurchAttendance, Volunteer, MarriedParents, MotherEducation, FatherEducation, Income,   
MathGrade, AvgExamScore, Erasmus, LivAbroad, StudentWorker. 
 
 
 